Privatization of peacekeeping: UN's institutional capacity to control Private Military and Security Companies

Abstract

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are perceived as a cost-effective alternative to the national troops contributed by member states to the UN peacekeeping operations. This thesis draws on the Thomas Bruneaus three-dimensional civil-military relations theory to answer the question: Can United Nations employ PMSCs in peacekeeping operations to achieve UN goals more fully than national militaries? Analysis of the UN peacekeeping system reveals that although the UN peacekeeping system has undergone several reforms and developed capacities, current structure and institutional power of the UN has serious shortcomings to control PMSCs and ensure effectiveness and efficiency. The UN needs to develop a more detailed doctrine; create an overarching institutional coordination mechanism; and enhance its logistics capacity to effectively employ PMSCs. Moreover, lose chain of command structure and vague exit strategies complicate the use of PMSCs in peacekeeping.