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dc.contributor.authorGolany, Boaz
dc.contributor.authorKress, Moshe
dc.contributor.authorPenn, Michael
dc.contributor.authorRothblum, Uriel G.
dc.date2012
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-09T22:22:00Z
dc.date.available2014-01-09T22:22:00Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citation2012 "Resource Allocation in an Asymmetric Technology Race with Temporary Advantages" (with B. Golany, M. Penn and U. Rothblum), Naval Research Logistics, V. 59, No. 2, pp 128-145.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/38167
dc.descriptionNaval Research Logistics, V. 59, No. 2, pp 128-145.en_US
dc.descriptionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nav.21477en_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider two opponents that compete in developing aeymmetric technologies where each party's technology is aimed at damaging (or neutralizing) the other's technology. The situation we consider is different than the classical problem of commercial R&D races in two ways: First, while in sommercial R&D races the competitors compete over the control of market share, in our case the comprtition is about the effectiveness of technologies with respect to certain capabilities. Second, in contrast with the "winner-takes-all" assumption that characterizes much of the literature on this field in the commercial world, we assume that the party that wins gains a temporary advantage that expires when the other party develops a superior technology. We formulate a variety of models that apply to a one-sided situation, where one of the two parties has to determine how much to invest in developing a technology to counter another technology employed by the other party. The decision problems are expressed as (convex) nonlinear optimization problems. We present an application that provides some operational insights regarding optimal resource allocation. We also consider a two-sided situation and develop a Nash equilibrium solution that sets investment values, so that both parties have no incentive to change their investments.en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleResource Allocation in an Asymmetric Technology Race with Temporary Advantagesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentOperations Research (OR)


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