Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorYost, David S.
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-15T18:39:42Z
dc.date.available2014-01-15T18:39:42Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/38369
dc.description.abstractThe NATO allies agreed at the Strasbourg/Kehl summit in April 2009 to prepare a new Strategic Concept for approval at their next summit. One of the issues in the Strategic Concept review will be the alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture and policy. While three members of the alliance (Britain, France and the United States) are nuclear powers, historically the greatest amount of attention has been focused on US ‘extended deterrence’—that is, the extension by Washington of an umbrella of protection, sometimes called a ‘nuclear guarantee’, to its allies. The history of NATO during the Cold War can be told as essentially a series of debates among the allies about the requirements of extended deterrence.en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School.en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleAssurance and US extended deterrence in NATOen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record