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dc.contributor.authorKapur, S. Paul
dc.dateFall 2008
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-15T18:57:51Z
dc.date.available2014-01-15T18:57:51Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationInternational Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 71–94
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/38376
dc.description.abstractIndia’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests of May 1998 put to rest years of speculation as to whether the two countries, long suspected of developing covert weapons capabilities, would openly exercise their so-called nuclear option. The dust had hardly settled from the tests, however, when a ªrestorm of debate erupted over nuclear weapons’ regional security implications. Some observers argued that nuclearization would stabilize South Asia by making Indo-Pakistani conflict prohibitively risky. Others maintained that, given India and Pakistan’s bitter historical rivalry, as well as the possibility of accident and miscalculation, proliferation would make the subcontinent more dangerous.1 The tenth anniversary of the tests offers scholars an opportunity to revisit this issue with the benefit of a decade of hindsight. What lessons do the intervening years hold regarding nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian security?en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleTen Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asiaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs


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