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dc.contributor.advisorRasmussen, Maria J.
dc.contributor.authorWright, Christopher E.
dc.dateMarch 2013
dc.date.accessioned2014-02-03T17:35:01Z
dc.date.available2014-02-03T17:35:01Z
dc.date.issued2013-03
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/38701
dc.descriptionApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe attacks of September 11, 2001, revealed a weakness in America’s defense—it lacked sufficient predictive domestic intelligence to prevent terrorism. More than a decade later, the American policy community continues to debate the need for an independent domestic intelligence service focused on counterterrorism. Debate often centers on whether or not the United States should create an intelligence service independent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It has given less attention to what characteristics are expected in a service if one were created. The questions of should and what are naturally intertwined. The former, however, often focuses on system-based factors exogenous to the service: administrative structures, oversight mechanisms, information-sharing bodies, and national legal frameworks. Generally absent from this debate is an isolated, systematic, evaluation of ideal characteristics endogenous to a domestic intelligence service. With a decade of reflection behind us, reframing the debate may help inform discussion on counterterrorism intelligence in America—so we may understand not only what we lack, but also what we should seek. Through an evaluation of literature on intelligence in democratic nations, and application of this evaluation to the post-9/11 discourse, this thesis identifies and analyzes characteristics deemed “ideal” in a service. It then tests these ideals in foreign security services often touted as models for America, in order to determine in what manner these characteristics exist, if at all. The study concludes by exploring lessons from this analysis to further inform debate, suggesting that the ideal characteristics expected in a domestic intelligence service are not only difficult to achieve in the modern counterterrorism environment, a strict pursuit of them may produce counterproductive results.en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, may not be copyrighted.en_US
dc.titleHidden threats: reframing the debate on domestic intelligence in an age of counterterrorismen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderBurkett, Randy P.
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs (NSA)
dc.subject.authorASIOen_US
dc.subject.authorAustralian Federal Policeen_US
dc.subject.authorAustralian Security Intelligence Organisationen_US
dc.subject.authorBritish Security Serviceen_US
dc.subject.authorBBSen_US
dc.subject.authorCounterterrorismen_US
dc.subject.authorDomestic Intelligenceen_US
dc.subject.authorFBIen_US
dc.subject.authorFederal Bureau of Investigationen_US
dc.subject.authorIntelligenceen_US
dc.subject.authorIntelligence and Democracyen_US
dc.subject.authorIntelligence Reformen_US
dc.subject.authorHomeland Securityen_US
dc.subject.authorMetropolitan Police Special Branchen_US
dc.subject.authorM15en_US
dc.subject.authorNational Securityen_US
dc.subject.authorU.S. Intelligenceen_US
dc.subject.authorU.S. Security Policyen_US
dc.description.serviceForeign Service Officer, U.S. Department of Stateen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Arts in National Security Affairs (Combating-Terrorism: Policy & Strategy)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineNational Securityen_US


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