The perilous slog of asymmetric warfare: a better way forward in Afghanistan; Strategic Insights; Vol. 9, Issue 1 (Spring/Summer 2010)
Abstract
The situation on the ground in Afghanistan remains tenuous. Despite a strategy that has been
under the auspices of a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign—as presented
by General McChrystal, officially sanctioned by President Obama during his historic address at
West Point, and likely to be continued under the command of General Petraeus—military and
political progress have been nominal relative to the resources committed. The latest operations in
Helmand Province illustrate this point. Though initial reports suggest that coalition forces were
effective in clearing the area—liberating villages and expunging Taliban resistance—the Taliban
have been successful in what Rajiv Chandrasekaran describes as being able to wait-out the initial
phases, and then strike against the “soft underbelly” of coalition operations—slowly reasserting
their presence in the area by launching sporadic kinetic strikes, as well as a staunch “campaign of
intimidation” toward the local population.
Description
Strategic Insights, v.9, Issue 1 (Spring/Summer 2010)