Defensive democratization in Jordan

Abstract

Jordan's political-liberalization program, initiated in 1989, represents the longest sustained such opening in the Arab world today. During this time, Jordan has held three national parliamentary elections, enacted a number of liberalizing laws, removed many restrictions on the press, and minimized the role that the security services, or mukhdbarit, play in repressing opposition. Moreover, the liberalization program has survived a number of severe challenges, including the second Gulf War and the subsequent loss of Jordan's major regional trading partner, Iraq; the implementation of a difficult domestic austerity program; and the conclusion of a controversial peace treaty with Israel. Democratization in Jordan has not followed the same path as the recent democratic transitions in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. By closely examining Jordan's program of political liberalization' since 1989, I will argue that the process is best understood as a series of pre-emptive measures designed to maintain elite privilege in Jordan while limiting the appeal of more fundamental political change. The regime has skillfully managed and directed a process that has throughout protected the four pillars of power in Jordan: the monarchy and its coterie, the army and security services, wealthy business elites, and East Bank tribal leaders. It has simultaneously sought to undermine the only social force legally able to disrupt key regime policies, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, and its political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). In other words, uncertain about its ability to survive a deepening crisis, the regime undertook sufficient reform to assure its political longevity, but without altering the core structures of power in Jordan. I term this "defensive democratization." The concept of defensive democratization provides an additional nuance to our understanding of democratic transitions more generally by focusing attention on pre-emptive liberalizing strategies available to rentier states. This essay concludes by arguing that the strategy of defensive democratization in Jordan may not be able to withstand the likely political volatility in, and Islamization of, Palestinian politics in Jordan. Ironically, what may pose the greatest threat to the democratic transition in Jordan is peace, with the sorts of demographic and political challenges the 1994 agreement with Israel has unleashed. Indeed, contrary to the optimistic forecasts found in many of the recent works on civil society, the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict may well usher in a new era of authoritarianism in Jordan-and elsewhere in the Arab world.