The effects of incentives on recruiter productivity
Ortiz, Luis, IV
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The objective of this research is to gain a greater understanding of how various incentives, both non-monetary and monetary, can impact recruiter productivity. Towards this end, I developed and administered a survey that was applied to most NRDs and elicited preferences for various monetary and non-monetary incentive schemes. One key result is that enlisted production recruiters tend not to value non-monetary awards, while management believes that these awards are important motivators. The other key result is that a modest bonus per high-quality contract (of $50 or $100), along with eliminating demand constraints, would significantly increase productivity. Based on conservative assumptions, I find that a $100 bonus per high-quality contract would allow for a reduction of over 600 recruiters and potentially have a 35-to-1 benefit-cost ratio. In light of potential problems of using bonuses, other results suggest that giving a half-day of liberty per HQ contract would also elicit significantly higher productivity, notably with no increase in costs.
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