U.S. policy towards Cuba as a two level game or defending executive policy discretion in the face of domestic pressure

Abstract

The literature on U.S. policy towards Cuba during the post Cold War period has focused around the idea that a small domestic group has dominated policy making because of their electoral influence in Florida and have left the executive at their mercy. Critics have often argued that the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) has been able to capture policy during non-crisis interludes and left poor policy options available to the executive powerless to respond effectively during critical periods and thus poor policies are implemented, not in tune with executive goals. This thesis aims to disprove the widespread consensus that U.S. policy towards Cuba has been dominated by Cuban-Americans since the end of the Cold War. Instead, the executive has been able to maneuver and adapt policy throughout the changing and complex political environment and seize control of the two level negotiations in order to achieve their own policy goals. Understanding the factors that shape U.S. policy toward Cuba is essential as Cuba approaches another important transition period with the ascendance of Raul Castro to the presidency. If policy makers continue to believe in the myth of CANF dominance, they are less likely to explore creative options for U.S. policy toward Cuba that might risk the ire of the group. Understanding the room for maneuver provided by the multiple interest groups with an interest in Cuba and public opinion is no guarantee of effective policy towards Cuba, but it would seem to be a necessary condition.