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dc.contributor.authorBruneau, Thomas C.
dc.contributor.authorDombroski, Kenneth R.
dc.dateWeb page capture on this date: 2014-06-04
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-04T22:44:29Z
dc.date.available2014-06-04T22:44:29Z
dc.date.issued2014-06-04
dc.date.issued2005-05-08
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/41971
dc.description.abstractWithin the realm of civilian control of the armed forces as a subset of civil-military relations, probably the most problematic issue is control of the intelligence services. This is due not only to the legacies of the prior, non-democratic regimes, in which the intelligence or security apparatus was a key element of control, and in which human rights abuses often were allowed, but also to the inherent tension everywhere between intelligence and democracy. Democracy requires accountability of the governors to the governed, and transparency. Intelligence services, by contrast, must operate in secret to be effective, thus violating to some degree both accountability and transparency (also called oversight). While well-established democracies have developed mechanisms to deal with this dilemma, new democracies are still in the process of creating them.en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleReforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New Democraciesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.) Monterey, California
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs (NSA)


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