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dc.contributor.advisorOwen, Guillermo
dc.contributor.authorEvans, Paul James
dc.dateJun-14
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-13T20:17:38Z
dc.date.available2014-08-13T20:17:38Z
dc.date.issued2014-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/42620
dc.description.abstractWe consider a game played between a state sponsor of international terrorism, a terrorist organization and the victim of a terrorist attack. The state sponsor wishes to inflict as much damage to the victim as possible without risking retaliation. The victim state wishes to end these attacks as soon as possible, through non-retaliatory means if possible in order to avoid the penalty associated with retaliation. In this thesis we compare and contrast the victim strategies of buyout, political attrition, and espionage tactics in an effort to maximize the profit of the victim and end the game without retaliation.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/alternativestore1094542620
dc.publisherMonterey, California: Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleAlternatives to retaliation in response to state sponsored terrorist attacksen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderKline, Jeffrey
dc.contributor.departmentApplied Mathematics
dc.subject.authorSecret coalitionsen_US
dc.subject.authorterrorismen_US
dc.subject.authornoncooperative gamesen_US
dc.subject.authorsecurity economicsen_US
dc.description.serviceEnsign, United States Navyen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Science in Mathematicsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineMathematicsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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