When do governments concede to terrorists?
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Authors
Lasiter, Nolan O.
Subjects
Government
concessions
violence
Colombia
concessions
violence
Colombia
Advisors
Freeman, Michael
Date of Issue
2014-06
Date
June 2014
Publisher
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
This study addresses the question of whether violence leads to governments making concessions. There were four hypotheses proposed that support the research on this question. The first proposed that there was no correlation between levels of violence and concessions. The second proposed that concessions increase as violence increases. The third proposed that concessions decrease as violence decreases. The final hypothesis proposed that there would be no concessions until a certain level of violence was reached, which was designated as a tipping point. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) served as the sample case study of this analysis. The findings indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship between levels of violence and the Colombian government making concessions to the FARC. Regardless of the amount of violence that the FARC perpetuates each year, the Colombian government does not make concessions. Further analysis suggests that there may be a relationship between presidential parties, elections cycles, and governments making concessions.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Defense Analysis (DA)
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.