Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorAbenheim, Donald
dc.contributor.advisorHalladay, Carolyn
dc.contributor.authorVirginia, Richard A., Jr.
dc.dateJune 2014
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-13T20:18:03Z
dc.date.available2014-08-13T20:18:03Z
dc.date.issued2014-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/42748
dc.descriptionApproved for public release; distribution is unlimiteden_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis examines the role of US mass persuasion during modern war and the effects of propaganda, strategic narrative, military strategy, and policy on morale and public opinion. Through historical analysis of several phases of US war propaganda, from the world wars to the Global War on Terror, this study aims to understand the political essence and the cultural and functional nuance of propaganda in a wartime democracy. Prevailing wisdom holds that the United States managed a coherent, focused, and intelligently wielded campaign of mass persuasion in Europe, 1941–1989. Yet, American strategic mass persuasion efforts since 2001 have consistently failed to persuade friend and foe of the strategic efficacy of American and allied campaigns. This thesis finds that wartime propaganda has little effect if it is not derived from a concrete overall strategy, policy, and narrative. The most impactful uses of mass persuasion rely on a perpetual rebalancing of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity—violence, chance, and policy, anchored in democratic statecraft and the virtues of pluralism. Therefore, to better facilitate balancing, an independent governmental agency charged with information management during war may better serve the public, policy makers and the military, producing the desired political ends.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/whywefightmasspe1094542748
dc.publisherMonterey, California: Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, may not be copyrighted.en_US
dc.titleWhy we fight: mass persuasion, morale, and American public opinion from World War I until the presenten_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs
dc.subject.authorPropagandaen_US
dc.subject.authorOffice of War Informationen_US
dc.subject.authorCommittee on Public Informationen_US
dc.subject.authorGlobal War on Terroren_US
dc.subject.authorWorld War Ien_US
dc.subject.authorWorld War IIen_US
dc.subject.authorCold Waren_US
dc.subject.authorVietnamen_US
dc.subject.authorKorean Waren_US
dc.subject.authorStrategyen_US
dc.subject.authorPolicyen_US
dc.subject.authorClausewitzen_US
dc.subject.authorTotal Waren_US
dc.subject.authorLimited War.en_US
dc.description.serviceLieutenant, United States Navyen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Arts in Security Studies (Europe and Eurasia)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studies (Europe and Eurasia)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record