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dc.contributor.authorMoran, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-28T18:28:13Z
dc.date.available2014-08-28T18:28:13Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/43146
dc.descriptionReviewed: The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, by Anthony H. Cordesman, and The Iraq War: A Military History, by Williamson Murray and Major General Robert H. Scalesen_US
dc.description.abstractThe United States and its allies went to war against Iraq in 2003, as Williamson Murray and Robert Scales reasonably propose, “to make an example out of Saddam’s regime, for better or worse” (p. 44). Exactly what the war exemplified, and whether the results are better or worse than might have been achieved by other means, are, to say the least, matters of continuing dispute. In the meantime, we might as well start getting the facts straight, at least as far as military operations are concerned. The two books above are both contributions to that necessary work. They are exercises in bridge-building, reaching forward from wartime journalism and postwar postmortems to the more mature scholarship of the future. Given the time pressure under which they were prepared, they are far better than anyone would have had reason to expect.en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleBook Review by Daniel Moran of The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons by Anthony H. Cordesman, and The Iraq War: A Military History by Williamson Murray and Major General Robert H. Scalesen_US
dc.typeBook Reviewen_US
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)


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