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dc.contributor.authorRussell, James A.
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-02T18:00:54Z
dc.date.available2014-09-02T18:00:54Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/43184
dc.descriptionBook review by James Russell: David Arbel and Ran Edelist, Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the Soviet Union 1980–1990. London: Frank Cass, 2003. 338 pp.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe role of intelligence in George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq shines a spotlight on an issue that makes most observers of national security affairs extremely uncomfortable, regardless of their political persuasion. After all, despite an estimated annual budget of $35 billion to $40 billion and many thousands of dedicated and bright employees using all the most sophisticated technologies available to the richest country on earth, the U.S. intelligence apparatus knew remarkably little about what was actually going on inside Iraq. How could this have happened? Why did senior U.S. ofªcials repeatedly make statements of certitude to back their justiªcations for the war, assuring the public that these statements were based on “intelligence” and therefore, by implication, were credible?en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleBook Review by James Russell of Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the Soviet Union 1980-1990 written by David Arbel and Ran Edelisten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs


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