Strategic Denial and Deception

Abstract

A concern about the threat of high-level denial and deception has waxed and waned among Americans since the end of World War II. Sometimes they fear that denial and deception has shaped threat assessments: witness the 1976 "A Team/B Team experiment" in competitive intelligence analysis undertaken by the Gerald R. Ford White House. At other times, the threat of denial and deception-here the euphoria accompanying the end of the Cold War comes to mind-seems to fade into insignificance. As the United States reigns as the only superpower and the world experiences a communication revolution, how much of a threat does denial and deception pose to American interests today? Do globalization, proliferating communication technologies, and the dissemination of vast amounts of information make effective foreign denial and deception more or less likely? Will more information and data sources make policymakers better informed or will the proliferation of information simply create confusion?