Architecting the safety assessment of large-scale systems integration

Abstract

This research identifies the information/data required to perform a safety assessment for large-scale systems integration. From these required safety-related information/data, and the utilization of system engineering processes and practices, a safety assessment architecture is developed. As a result, the risk of known hazards is mitigated to as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) and the system health of these large-scale system integrations is improved throughout the system's life cycle. The thesis first identifies the current gap in system safety assessment for large-scale system integrations, especially in the area of Commercial of the Shelf (COTS) and Non-Developmental Item (NDI) systems integration. Next, with reference to the DoD system life cycle process, a COTS/NDI system integration life cycle process model is proposed. In addition, in line with the DoD policy to have a joint weapon system safety review board, a system safety functional hierarchy is then created. Using the functional hierarchy created, more detailed sub-functions and measures of effectiveness for system safety assessment are then analyzed. Finally, a hazard list table is proposed as a tool to be used in relation to the system safety assessment functional hierarchy so as to achieve the objective to identify, mitigate, trace and accept all residual risks associated with the large-scale system integration throughout its life cycle. A case example of the Harpoon Weapon System (HWS) safety assessment on a ship platform is used to further explain the usage and process of generating, maintaining and tracking the hazard list table.