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dc.contributor.authorGiraldo, Jeanne Kinney
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-16T17:53:58Z
dc.date.available2014-09-16T17:53:58Z
dc.date.issued2001-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/43360
dc.descriptionOccasional Paper # 9en_US
dc.description.abstractAs countries democratize, newly-elected governments find that they must quickly assert control over the budget, especially the defense budget, if they are to meet their policy goals for all sectors and assert civilian control over the military. Fiscally, the process by which budget decisions are made should be structured so that defense spending does not “break the bank” by exceeding the government’s capacity to pay. Sectorally, defense should compete with other government ministries so that the final overall budget is a monetary expression of the priorities of the nation, its choice between “guns and butter.” Within the defense sector, the allocation of resources for training, personnel, and equipment should reflect the roles and missions for the armed forces established during a process of national security planning. Finally, the power of the purse provides civilians with a key lever of control over the military: government preferences are more likely to be taken into account when they are backed by the provision or withholding of resources.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThe Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleDefense Budgets and Civilian Oversight, Occasional Paper #9en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs (NSA)en_US


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