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dc.contributor.advisorLooney, Robert
dc.contributor.authorBusch, Benjamin C.
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-14T17:41:42Z
dc.date.available2012-03-14T17:41:42Z
dc.date.issued2009-12
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/4377
dc.description.abstractAlthough threats and punishments have historically been the more prevalent tools of U.S. foreign policy, the current U.S. administration is signaling a reorientation toward a more positive inducement strategy. Much is written on incentives, but few have taken an in depth look at how third parties should properly place incentives to maximize their effect. This thesis suggests that a cognitive bargaining model may provide a useful analysis tool for deciding when and where to use positive incentives. The model proposed in this thesis uses James Fearon's rational bargaining and war theory as a base. Then, by folding in Prospect Theory, a bargaining model is developed that can account for the effects of third party incentives. This model is put to the test by looking at Ukraine's denuclearization in the early 1990s. Using the cognitive bargaining model as a framework, Ukraine's bargain reached via the Lisbon Protocol in 1992 is compared to the one achieved in the 1994 Trilateral Agreement. This thesis finds that the cognitive bargaining model provides a useful analysis tool, and recommends further development of this model so that future offers of incentives by the United States achieve the most "bang for the buck."en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/cognitivebargain109454377
dc.format.extentxvi, 81 p. : ill., 1 col. mapen_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.subject.lcshPeaceen_US
dc.subject.lcshNegotiationen_US
dc.titleCognitive bargaining model an analysis tool for third party incentives?en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderTsypkin, Mikhail
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs
dc.description.recognitionOutstanding Thesisen_US
dc.description.serviceUS Air Force (USAF) author.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc503134646
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Arts in Security Studiesen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studiesen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
etd.verifiednoen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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