Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorLin, Kyle Y.
dc.contributor.authorBar-Ilan, Ittai
dc.dateSep-14
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-05T20:09:49Z
dc.date.available2014-12-05T20:09:49Z
dc.date.issued2014-09
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/43871
dc.descriptionApproved for public release; distribution is unlimiteden_US
dc.description.abstractWe study the interaction between individuals in a population, where each individual encounters one another at random intervals, and in each encounter the two individuals play one round of the game of prisoner’s dilemma. By discounting future reward, and allowing for imperfect memory and mobility of the individuals, we study the evolutionary equilibrium strategy to identify situations where cooperation emerges. We find that cooperation among individuals typically emerges when future reward becomes more important, when individuals in the population have better memory, and when the individuals move in and out of the population less frequently. The findings help explain social loafing and free rider commonly seen in towns, corporations, and military units.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/howsuspiciongrow1094543871
dc.publisherMonterey, California: Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, may not be copyrighted.en_US
dc.titleHow suspicion grows: effects of population size on cooperationen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderAtkinson, Michael
dc.contributor.departmentOperations Research
dc.subject.authorIterated gamesen_US
dc.subject.authorcooperationen_US
dc.subject.authorsuspicionen_US
dc.subject.authordiscount parameteren_US
dc.subject.authorpopulationen_US
dc.subject.authorshadow of the futureen_US
dc.subject.authordefetcionen_US
dc.subject.authorsocial loafingen_US
dc.subject.authorfree-rideren_US
dc.subject.authorgames theoryen_US
dc.subject.authorevolutionary stable strategyen_US
dc.description.recognitionOutstanding Thesisen_US
dc.description.serviceCaptain, Israel Defense Forcesen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Science in Operations Researchen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineOperations Researchen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record