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dc.contributor.advisorHuntley, Wade L.
dc.contributor.advisorTsypkin, Mikhail
dc.contributor.authorMedvedev, Sergei A.
dc.dateMarch 2015
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-06T19:17:50Z
dc.date.available2015-05-06T19:17:50Z
dc.date.issued2015-03
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/45225
dc.description.abstractThe Russian Federation is a key state actor in cyberspace; cyber events associated with Russian state and non-state actors have threatened Russia’s neighbors, shaped international cyber norms, as well as influenced strategists’ understanding of cyber power. This thesis seeks to understand Russian cyber capability through the lens of Robert Jervis’s offense-defense theory in order to answer the thesis’s central question: Do Russian cyber capabilities reflect an investment in offensive or defensive cyber weapons, and do Russia’s cyber technology, doctrine, and policy differentiate its posture as offensive or defensive? To evaluate Russian cyber capability, this thesis considers two factors—technology and geography—concluding that, although the Russian government is modifying its cyber terrain to improve defensiveness, Russia’s brandished cyber weapons suggest that it pursues offensive capability. To evaluate Russia’s posture differentiation, the thesis examines Russians’ understanding of cyber power, Russian information warfare and hybrid warfare doctrines, and the country’s international engagements, concluding that, although Russia has historically presented its posture as defensive, it is increasingly difficult to make that distinction. Finally, the thesis evaluates this state-level analysis in the broader context of the international system; Russia’s historical aggression and current behavior in cyberspace likely reflects Stephen van Evera’s explanATOry hypothesis for the causes of war—defensive expansion.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/offensedefenseor1094545225
dc.publisherMonterey, California: Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleOffense-defense theory analysis of Russian cyber capabilityen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairsen_US
dc.subject.authorRussiaen_US
dc.subject.authorcyberen_US
dc.subject.authorcyberspaceen_US
dc.subject.authoroffense-defense theoryen_US
dc.subject.authorinformation warfareen_US
dc.subject.authorhybrid warfare. 15.NUMBER OFPAGES 109en_US
dc.description.recognitionOutstanding Thesisen_US
dc.description.serviceMajor, United States Air Forceen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Arts in Security Studies (Europe and Eurasia)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studies (Europe and Eurasia)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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