Civil-Military Relations and militarization in El Salvador

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the state of Civil-Military Relations and militarization in El Salvador under the leadership of President Mauricio Funes (2009–2014). Civil-Military Relations are examined using the Center for Civil-Military Relations trinity framework—first proposed by Thomas C. Bruneau in the journal Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad in 2005—which considers effectiveness, efficiency, and democratic civilian control. Militarization is presented in terms of Salvadoran troops in the streets. This thesis presents the linkage of these two phenomena as domestic security policy formation and implementation. The analysis demonstrates that informal Civil-Military Relations have resulted in a largely undemocratic response to El Salvador’s sizeable security challenges. Two cases, in particular, are studied more closely: 1) President Funes’ unique relationship with General David Munguía Payés and 2) the government’s secret design of the 2012 gang truce. This thesis concludes that security policy formation under the Funes administration was haphazardly conducted as an expedient to El Salvador’s security dilemma and resulted in at least a partial democratic breakdown in the processes envisioned by the 1992 peace accords.