Computational algebraic attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
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Authors
Mantzouris, Panteleimon
Subjects
Advisors
Canright, David
Butler, Jon
Date of Issue
2009-09
Date
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
This thesis examines the vulnerability of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to algebraic attacks. It will explore how strong the Rijndael algorithm must be in order to secure important federal information. There are several algebraic methods of attack that can be used to break a specific cipher, such as Buchburger's and Faugere's F4 and F5 methods. The method to be used and evaluated in this thesis is the Multiple Right Hand Sides (MRHS) Linear Equations. MRHS is a new method that allows computations to be more efficient and the equations to be more compact in comparison with the previously referred methods. Because of the high complexity of the Rijndael algorithm, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the results of an MRHS attack in a small-scale variant of the AES, since it is impossible to break the actual algorithm by using only the existent knowledge. Instead of the original ten rounds of AES algorithm, variants of up to four rounds were used. Simple examples of deciphering some ciphertexts are presented for different variants of the AES, and the new attack method of MRHS linear equations is compared with the other older methods. This method is more effective timewise than the other older methods, but, in some cases, some systems cannot be uniquely solved.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Electrical Engineering
Applied Mathematics
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
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NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
xvi, 103 p. : col. ill.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.