DNS rebinding attacks

Abstract

A Domain Name System (DNS) Rebinding attack compromises the integrity of name resolution in DNS with the goal of controlling the IP address of the host to which the victim ultimately connects. The same origin policy and DNS Pinning techniques were introduced to protect Web browsers from DNS rebinding attacks, but their effectiveness has been undermined by vulnerabilities introduced by plug-ins such as JavaScript and Adobe Flash Player. The new attacks fall into two broad categories: firewall circumvention and IP hijacking, depending on the consequences of each attack. Using a realistic network testbed, this research has enacted two firewall circumvention attack scenarios, with JavaScript and Adobe Flash Player respectively. Also confirmed is the effectiveness of several published countermeasures, including configuration options for DNS and Web servers, and security updates released by plug-in vendors. Finally, the research analyzes the defense-readiness of the DNS server and client configuration guidelines used by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), including the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) DNS Security Technical Implementation Guidance (STIG), the Windows Vista Client Specialized Security Limited Functionality (SSLF) Guidance, and the split-DNS architecture.