Tri-level optimization of critical infrastructure resilience
Loading...
Authors
Babick, John P.
Subjects
Advisors
Carlyle, W. Matthew
Date of Issue
2009-09
Date
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
We introduce a new way to perform network analysis on critical infrastructure that is superior to Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP), currently used by the Department of Homeland Security. We introduce the idea of a Design-Attack-Defend (DAD) model that determines the optimal defense plan for a critical infrastructure network within a specified budget constraint. Design-Attack-Defend first determines worst-case attacks and then determines where to defend or build additional infrastructure that will maximize the surviving efficiency of the infrastructure after a malicious attack or natural disaster. Design- Attack-Defend ensures that the defense plan suggested is optimal to a range of attacks, out of all possible defense plans, within budget constraints. The Design-Attack-Defend will always give a solution at least as good as RAMCAP and as a simpler, bi-level Attacker-Defender model-and in many cases it can be expected to suggest a better plan for where to defend or build additional critical infrastructure. We demonstrate with a model of the Western U.S. railroad network.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Operations Research
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
xvii, 51 p. : 1 col map ;
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.