Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorHesford, James W.
dc.contributor.authorMangin, Nicolas
dc.contributor.authorPizzini, Mina
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-24T23:03:52Z
dc.date.available2015-09-24T23:03:52Z
dc.date.issued2014-12
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/46668
dc.descriptionConference: AAA 2015 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting, AAA 2015 Annual meeting, Volume: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2482829en_US
dc.description.abstractThis study uses field data from 490 hotels in a single lodging chain to investigate three questions related to the efficiency-wage hypothesis. (1) Does paying workers higher relative wages ex ante result in better ex post actual performance, either by motivating workers to exert greater effort or by attracting higher quality workers? (2) Is the magnitude of the relation between performance and wages the same when workers are overpaid versus underpaid? (3) Do the overall benefits of paying higher wages outweigh the costs? The data enable us to perform powerful tests of wageperformance relations because exogenous factors that likely affect employee behavior are standardized across hotels. Our results suggest that actual performance (measured by customer satisfaction, revenues, and profit) is increasing in the relative wage, and that higher performance is the result, and not the cause, of higher wages. We find that the magnitude of the wageperformance relation is at least as large for workers who are overpaid compared to those who are underpaid. This result, which differs from the results of experimental studies, suggests that overpaid workers do not rationalize away wage premiums. Finally, our results indicate that increases in wages do, in fact, pay for themselves. A $1,000 increase in the general manager’s relative wage results in a $1,080 increase in profit for the mean hotel. This research contributes to a series of studies that investigates the extent to which wages influence performance (e.g., Levine, 1992; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Hannan, Kagal, and Moser, 2002; Hannan, 2005), and whether the marginal benefit of wage increases justifies their costs (Levin, 1993).en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleDo Higher Wages Pay for Themselves? An Intra-firm Test of the Effect of Wages on Employee Performanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentGraduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP)en_US
dc.subject.authorefficiency wagesen_US
dc.subject.authorimplicit contractsen_US
dc.subject.authorrelative wagesen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record