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dc.contributor.advisorLooney, Robert E.
dc.contributor.advisorMabry, Tristan J.
dc.contributor.authorAndre, David M.
dc.dateSep-15
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-06T18:22:01Z
dc.date.available2015-11-06T18:22:01Z
dc.date.issued2015-09
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/47224
dc.description.abstractIn the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, it became apparent to U.S. foreign policy makers that Northwest Africa was more than just a humanitarian concern. This realization led to the establishment of a multi-pronged, multi-year counterterrorism strategy in the Trans-Sahara region that incorporated diplomacy, development, and defense. Despite these unprecedented efforts, the Sahel sub-region has witnessed a steady rise in the presence of Salafi-Jihadist organizations since 2003. Furthermore, the states in the region remain incapable of defending against these organizations without significant outside assistance. This thesis examines the efficacy of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region vis-à-vis African states’ capacity to explain the persisting Salafi-Jihadist organizations in the region. Exploring Salafi-Jihadism’s ideological, doctrinal, and historical aspects illustrates that these organizations have limited interest in political solutions. The thesis uses Nigeria, Mali, and Mauritania as three case studies to examine the period between 2001 and 2014 to demonstrate how Salafi-Jihadism’s components have successfully exploited these states’ limited capacity, thereby undermining U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The thesis concludes by considering the impacts that these conclusions will have on future counterterrorism initiatives.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/unitedstatescoun1094547224
dc.publisherMonterey, California: Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleUnited States counterterrorism strategy in the Trans-Sahara and the rise of Salafi-Jihadism in the Sahelen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairsen_US
dc.subject.authorSalafi-Jihadismen_US
dc.subject.authorSahelen_US
dc.subject.authorTrans-Saharaen_US
dc.subject.authorBoko Haramen_US
dc.subject.authorNigeriaen_US
dc.subject.authorMUJAOen_US
dc.subject.authorMalien_US
dc.subject.authorAQIMen_US
dc.subject.authorMauritaniaen_US
dc.subject.authorcounterterrorismen_US
dc.subject.authorterrorismen_US
dc.subject.authorAnsar-al Dineen_US
dc.description.serviceLieutenant, United States Navyen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Arts in Security Studies (Middle East, South Asia, Sub-saharan Africa)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studies (Middle East, South Asia, Sub-saharan Africa)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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