Measuring the deterrence value of securing maritime supply chains against WMD transfer and measuring subsequent WMD risk reduction
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We propose a methodology to analyze the risk of an adversary exploiting the maritime supply chain by smuggling a WMD in a container. We call this risk “WMD transfer risk”. We describe an extension of an existing modeling/simulation tool wherein we show how to quantify the deterrence effects of optimal investments in WMD detection technology at U.S. ports; and measure subsequent reduction in WMD transfer risk. From a theoretical perspective, the implications of notional results from this model are different from implications of the results of traditional “game theoretical” models. From a practitioner perspective, our results emphasize the importance of tailoring foreign intelligence gathering efforts, hardening foreign ports against exploitation in addition to hardening U.S. ports, and comparing simulated optimal technology costs to real-world R&D and implementation costs. The audience for our proposal includes WMD detection technology engineers, law enforcement and security personnel, port operators, and agency executives.
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