What are we missing? a call for red teaming within the domestic maritime domain for anti-terrorism programs

Abstract

As a component of the Department of Homeland Security and the department’s lead for maritime security, the Coast Guard is charged with executing theUnited States domestic maritime anti-terrorism program. It is critical that Coast Guard policy, plans, and tactics maintain pace with the ever-changing risks associated with terrorism. This thesis examines alternative analysis red teaming and its potential value to the Coast Guard. Specifically, it seeks to answer how red teaming can be leveraged to enhance the value of domestic maritime anti-terrorism activities. The research reviews elements of the maritime domain and principles of red teaming, and proposes and provides implementation recommendations for a terrorism red teaming program for the domestic maritime domain. The study revealed that a red team program would be value added to the Coast Guard for domestic maritime anti-terrorism programs. Leveraging the concept of a minimal viable program, the thesis proposes a red team program and strategy to implement the program within the U.S. Coast Guard. The suggested program would be comprised of three elements: physical red teaming, identification of future attack scenarios, and policy red teaming. The thesis further provides insight into the implementation of these programs and suggests a minimal viable program approach to establishing a terrorism red teaming program for the domestic maritime domain.