A game theoretic model of strategic conflict in cyberspace
Schramm, Harrison C.
Alderson, David L.
Carlyle, W. Matthew
Dimitrov, Nedialko B.
MetadataShow full item record
We study cyber conflict as a strictly competitive, two-person game in discrete time, where each player discovers new exploits according to an independent random process. Upon discovery, the player must decide if and when to exercise a munition based on that exploit. The payoff from using the munition is a function of time that is (generally) increasing. These factors create a basic tension: the longer a player waits to exercise a munition, the greater his payoff because the munition is more mature, but also the greater the chance that the opponent will also discover the exploit and nullify the munition. Assuming perfect knowledge and under mild restrictions on the time-dependent payoff function for a munition, we derive optimal exercise strategies and quantify the value of engaging in cyber conflict. Our analysis also leads to high level insights on cyber conflict strategy.
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Granlund, Rego; Smith, Kip; Granlund, Helena (2011-06);This paper describes C3Conflict, a research and training environment developed to support research and training of co-ordination and collaborative work in C2 situations. C3Conflict is a command, control and communication, ...
Kennelly, Kevin G. (Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2006-12);On Europe's periphery lie a number of unresolved conflict and unrecognized states most of which emerged during the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Due to their remote and strategically insignificant nature, they were ...
Arca, Henón, Santiago (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2016-06);As a conflict management strategy, mediation has offered a way to abate or resolve conflicts, and it is a solid alternative to escalating hostilities. Most academic works analyze mediation by studying the mediators' roles ...