An analysis of the future combat systems (FCS) spin out 1 low-rate of initial prpoduction (LRIP) contract

Abstract

Program managers would like to minimize the risk associated with the acquisition of their system in order to better control costs, schedule, and performance. It is especially important to do so in cutting-edge programs with a history of complexity, difficulty or controversy Deservedly or not, the lead system integrator (LSI) approach used in the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program has been criticized for relying too heavily on private industry to manage this innovative, large scale acquisition program. The objections from Congress center on government's surrender of too much of its responsibility, authority, and budget to private industry. As a result of the concern over the use of LSIs, program managers are understandably interested in minimizing risk to better control costs, schedule, and performance. In order to minimize risk, it is essential that contracts are written well, with appropriate specificity, and include not only the desired goods or services, but also essential information that enables the program manager to track the progress of contract performance and to quickly detect potential problems. This research takes a high-level/macro approach to identifying issues and suggesting items that should be considered when developing the Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract for Spin Out 1 of the FCS program.