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dc.contributor.authorBlumstein, Daniel T.
dc.contributor.authorAtran, Scott
dc.contributor.authorField, Scott
dc.contributor.authorHochberg, Michael E.
dc.contributor.authorJohnson, Dominic D.P.
dc.contributor.authorSagarin, Raphael
dc.contributor.authorSosis, Richard
dc.contributor.authorThayer, Bradley
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-21T18:46:50Z
dc.date.available2016-03-21T18:46:50Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationBlumstein, Daniel T., et al. 2012. The Peacock's Tale: Lessons from evolution for effective signaling in international politics (with comment). Cliodynamics: Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History, v. 3, iss. 1, pp. 191–214.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/48183
dc.description.abstractKnowing how to send and interpret signals is an essential part of both diplomacy and war. Political scientists have recognized that costly signals—gestures and actions that involve significant cost or risk—are central to politics and diplomacy since modeling doyen James Fearon built his Ph. D. thesis around the concept in the 1990s. Because these signaling systems are pervasive in nature (many of these strategies arise independently and repeatedly to solve common problems suggesting evolutionary pressure to select strategies offering the most success at the least cost), their underlying strategic logic has important implications to foreign policy challenges we face today. By capitalizing on solutions derived by evolution over 3. 5 billion years of life on Earth, we may identify ideas that otherwise might not have been explored in a policy context potentially offering quick, novel, and effective options to increase strategic and combat effectiveness. Here we present 8 lessons from evolution for political science.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipsupported by the National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis, and the Office of Naval Research-Globalen_US
dc.format.extent24 p.en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleThe Peacock's Tale: Lessons from evolution for effective signaling in international politicsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)en_US
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairsen_US


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