Do good fences still make good neighbors? integrating force protection with homeland security on Army installations

Abstract

Army installations have been uniquely affected by the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and homeland security initiatives as a result of the attacks on September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, most have not done enough in coordinating and integrating their antiterrorism plans with the crisis response and consequence management plans of their adjacent civilian municipalities. This thesis argues that fences and guards are not enough to protect Army installations against terrorist attack, or against any other natural or man-made disaster, nor do installations have the wherewithal to respond effectively on their own should disaster strike. Doctrine is clear, and regulations and policy have been published guiding the Army (and other military services) in providing Civil Support to state and local authorities during times of crisis; but what is less clear, or more precisely, non-existent, is the doctrine regarding how Army installations would receive and integrate support from local and state officials in response to disasters occurring on the installation. Now more than ever, Army installations require municipal support to effectively respond to terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and accidents. Indeed, Army installations must reach across their perimeter fences and embrace municipal partners in integrating force protection with homeland security.