Countermeasures to insider cyber threats for Turkish General Command of Gendarmerie

Abstract

Insider threats expose every nation, state, and business entity to danger; however, most of these organizations do not realize this, or they choose to ignore it. Since most studies and technical solutions for insider threats originate from the United States, a good starting point for organizations such as the Turkish General Command of Gendarmerie (TGCG) would be to analyze lessons learned from U.S. examples to try to find ways to adapt countermeasures, considering cultural constraints. This thesis provides background information about attributes of insider threats, summarizes malicious insiders' characteristics and motivations, and reviews documents (e.g., presidential memorandums, directives, best practices, mitigation strategies) published in the United States for countering insider threats in the United States. Then, technical and non-technical key practices for TGCG are explained. These practices are analyzed in terms of the effects of Turkish culture by using Geert Hofstede's dimensions of national cultures. Finally, recommendations for conceptual implementations of countermeasures to TGCG are presented.