Countering small boat terrorism in territorial sea
MetadataShow full item record
Terrorists exploit surprise in successful attackssecurity forces are generally unaware of the source of these attacks. In today's information age, terror threats may originate with transnational organizations or exploit the territory of failed, weak or neutral states. Countering maritime terrorism by eliminating terrorists on land is the best solutionhowever, it may not be feasible, and if feasible could require many years. This thesis utilizes Game Theory to analyze various counterterrorism strategies, and infers how security forces could tilt the game of small boat terror attacks to their advantage. Since Israel has immense experience in countering small boat terrorism, Israeli coastal defense is analyzed, examining how detection and identification enhance Maritime Space Transparency (MST), adapting Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) to territorial sea. Since MST needs to be maintained continuously in time and large spatial domains, the feasibility of utilizing Automatic Identification System (AIS), Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) and electro-optical sensors on aerostats, and AIS and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) from Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites to generate a Common Operating Picture (COP) is explored. The optimum number of aerostats fitted with an appropriate sensor suite is calculated with multi-criteria optimization to provide more than 89% MST. The thesis concludes with recommendations, such as amending existing International Maritime Organization AIS fitment policy from size-based to role-based fitment.
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited