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dc.contributor.advisorKapur, Paul S.
dc.contributor.authorRhodes, Quinn J.
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-14T17:44:45Z
dc.date.available2012-03-14T17:44:45Z
dc.date.issued2010-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/5251
dc.description.abstractIn May 1998, both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices, adding new complications to an already volatile security environment. In the years since these tests, the Indian subcontinent has been the site of one war in 1999 and numerous other military confrontations, the biggest occurring in 2001 and 2002. The majority of these conflicts have risen from attacks in India and Kashmir carried out by non-state actors based in Pakistan. India thus faces a compellence problem in which it wants to force Pakistan to stop its perceived support of these actors, and yet it can only do so to a limited extent for fear of nuclear retaliation. India's answer, following the 2001/2002 military standoff with Pakistan, is the Cold Start doctrine, a strategy of limited war under the nuclear umbrella. This thesis examines the efficacy of the Cold Start doctrine in the context of three major areas: Pakistan's principal-agent dilemma, historical escalation problems on the subcontinent, and domestic Indian civil-military and inter-service rivalry issues. Based on the findings regarding these areas, this study will show that Cold Start is not the answer to India's compellence problem. Rather, cooperation to combat a common foe is a more practical solution than mutual antagonism.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/limitedwarundern109455251
dc.format.extentxii, 109 p. : col. maps. ;en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.subject.lcshLimited waren_US
dc.subject.lcshCivil-military relationsen_US
dc.subject.lcshNuclear weaponsen_US
dc.titleLimited war under the nuclear umbrella : an analysis of India's Cold Start doctrine and its implications for stability on the subcontinenten_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderPorch, Douglas
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.contributor.departmentSecurity Studies
dc.description.serviceUS Navy (USN) authoren_US
dc.identifier.oclc648174363
etd.thesisdegree.nameM.A.en_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studiesen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
etd.verifiednoen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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