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dc.contributor.authorArmey, L.
dc.contributor.authorMelese, F.
dc.contributor.otherDefense Resources Management Institute (DRMI)
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-25T19:07:03Z
dc.date.available2017-04-25T19:07:03Z
dc.date.issued2017-04
dc.identifier.citationL. Armey & F. Melese (2017): Minimizing Public Sector Corruption: The Economics of Crime, Identity Economics, and Money Laundering, Defence and Peace Economics, DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1318013
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/52703
dc.descriptionThis version includes corrections, republished in the article of record: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1318013
dc.descriptionThe article of record may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1318013en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper offers a simple strategic framework to help governments use various policy mechanisms to minimize public sector corruption. The paper offers a formal model that blends economics of crime models with identity economics and money laundering. It presents a partial equilibrium framework that focuses on a representative public official engaged in a mix of legal and illegal effort. The model introduces various levers a government might use to impact the costs and benefits of illegal effort. The ultimate goal is to help turn volatile vicious cycles of political instability, into steady virtuous cycles of stability, growth and sustainable development.en_US
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis Group
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleMinimizing Public Sector Corruption: The Economics of Crime, Identity Economics, and Money Launderingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.authorCorruption||identity economics||transperancy and accountability||crime||building integrity


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