Blind data attack on BGP routers

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Authors
Catudal, Joseph W.
Subjects
BGP
TCP
blind attack
blind data attack
Advisors
Beverly, Robert
Date of Issue
2017-03
Date
Mar-17
Publisher
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
Transport Communication Protocol (TCP) implementations may not properly implement blind attack protection, leaving long-standing connections, such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) sessions, vulnerable to exploitation. This thesis aims to understand the efficacy of a blind data attack on BGP sessions. This thesis examines BGP, the protocols BGP relies on, and the effectiveness of safeguards against BGP blind attacks. A series of blind attack tests are performed against various production BGP implementations to determine how dangerous and feasible a blind attack is on BGP routing information integrity. Blind data attacks can inject and temporarily propagate erroneous routing information; however, on the routers tested, the complexity required to brute force connection-specific values makes blind data attacks difficult. Also, there is a high probability that a blind data attack will desynchronize a BGP session without modifying routing information. Protective measures are available that could further safeguard BGP sessions, but older router images may not implement some of the most vital protections recommended today. Organizations responsible for routing infrastructure and network security must carefully weigh the risk of not implementing more strict protection measures should a discovered vulnerability reduce attack complexity.
Type
Thesis
Description
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10945/52961
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Department
Cyber Acadamic Group (CAG)
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Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
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