Allocating non-monetary incentives for Navy Nurse Corps Officers : menu method vs. bid method Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

Abstract

This research will examine the use of a computer-based experimental program utilizing a Menu Method and Bid Method Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) to address the impact of monetary and non-monetary incentives for Navy Nurse Corps (NC) Officers. A labor market experiment will conducted under laboratory conditions to represent the natural market. Additionally, the research will investigate the individual and cohort behavior of participants in the decision-making process when examining monetary and non-monetary incentive options. Previous research has shown CRAM to be the most desirable and effective auction mechanism for creating a balance between value to the member and overall cost to the Navy. The computer-based experiments revealed optimal decision-making behaviors utilizing Menu Method and Bid Method CRAM. The results of the experiment will further assess the usage of CRAM methods for increasing retention among Navy Nurse Corps Officers, while minimizing the cost to provide the incentives and maximizing personal utility. This thesis is compose of three major components: (1) a review of the current status of the Navy Nurse Corps community, (2) a review of previous studies and reports related to Navy Nurse Corps retention, experimental economics, and auction mechanisms, (3) analysis of data obtained from the labor market experiments based on combinatorial auction mechanisms. The conclusions drawn for the analysis revealed that subjects in the experiment consistently bid their true and optimal value where value > cost, thereby maximizing their value and producing substantial cost savings.