Allocating non-monetary incentives for Navy Nurse Corps Officers : menu method vs. bid method Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)
Author
Levy, Marlow H.
Date
2010-03Advisor
Gates, William R.
Coughlan, Peter
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
This research will examine the use of a computer-based experimental program utilizing a Menu Method and Bid Method Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) to address the impact of monetary and non-monetary incentives for Navy Nurse Corps (NC) Officers. A labor market experiment will conducted under laboratory conditions to represent the natural market. Additionally, the research will investigate the individual and cohort behavior of participants in the decision-making process when examining monetary and non-monetary incentive options. Previous research has shown CRAM to be the most desirable and effective auction mechanism for creating a balance between value to the member and overall cost to the Navy. The computer-based experiments revealed optimal decision-making behaviors utilizing Menu Method and Bid Method CRAM. The results of the experiment will further assess the usage of CRAM methods for increasing retention among Navy Nurse Corps Officers, while minimizing the cost to provide the incentives and maximizing personal utility. This thesis is compose of three major components: (1) a review of the current status of the Navy Nurse Corps community, (2) a review of previous studies and reports related to Navy Nurse Corps retention, experimental economics, and auction mechanisms, (3) analysis of data obtained from the labor market experiments based on combinatorial auction mechanisms. The conclusions drawn for the analysis revealed that subjects in the experiment consistently bid their true and optimal value where value > cost, thereby maximizing their value and producing substantial cost savings.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.Collections
Related items
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
-
Variability of valuation of non-monetary incentives motivating and implementing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism
Ellis, Jason Blake (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009-03);This thesis explores the concept of preference variability relative to non-monetary and monetary incentives in the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). CRAM offers a mix of monetary and non-monetary incentives ... -
Integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)
Zimmerman, Brooke Maura (Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2008-12);This research addressed the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted Sailors ... -
The combinatorial retention auction mechanism (CRAM): integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives
Coughlan, Peter J.; Gates, William R.; Zimmerman, Brooke M. (Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2011-11); NPS-GSBPP-11-013This research addresses the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavioral in enlisted ...