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dc.contributor.advisorBlanken, Leo
dc.contributor.authorStanfield, Erik J.
dc.dateJun-17
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-14T16:46:43Z
dc.date.available2017-08-14T16:46:43Z
dc.date.issued2017-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/55539
dc.descriptionApproved for public release; distribution is unlimiteden_US
dc.description.abstractIn August 2016, President Obama directed U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to take the lead in synchronizing Department of Defense (DOD) plans for countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), thus orchestrating a shift in national strategy. Under this new role, USSOCOM signaled an intent to increase military efforts to identify and prevent proliferation threats from metastasizing into crises. This approach represents a turn from USSOCOM's prevailing emphasis on WMD crisis response. But what are the conditions under which military contributions—in collaboration with other U.S. government agencies—enhance the national strategy to counter WMD acquisition, development, and proliferation prior to a crisis? USSOCOM offers a unique perspective in addressing this question, based on its experience synchronizing military counterterrorism plans since 2003. This study analyzes USSOCOM's role in counterterrorism strategy and evaluates the application of this experience to counter-WMD strategy. The research generates two conclusions. First, friction caused by varied meanings and understandings of organizational language can be overcome by educating the force on language already in use and emphasizing WMD threat pathways as the shared calibration point between organizations. Second, USSOCOM can improve counter-WMD strategy by replacing rigid command hierarchies with a networked, interorganizational response unified around specific threats.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/lostintranslatio1094555539
dc.publisherMonterey, California: Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleLost in translation: Lessons from counterterrorism for a more proactive weapons of mass destruction strategyen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderDavis, Zachary
dc.contributor.departmentDefense Analysis (DA)
dc.subject.authorweapons of mass destructionen_US
dc.subject.authorcountering weapons of mass destructionen_US
dc.subject.authornonproliferationen_US
dc.subject.authorcounterproliferationen_US
dc.subject.authorconsequence managementen_US
dc.subject.authororganizational languageen_US
dc.subject.authorcollaborationen_US
dc.subject.authornetworked organizationen_US
dc.subject.authorU.S. Special Operations Commanden_US
dc.subject.authorinteragencyen_US
dc.description.recognitionOutstanding Thesisen_US
dc.description.serviceMajor, United States Armyen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Science in Defense Analysisen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineDefense Analysisen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US


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