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dc.contributor.authorHiles, John
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-26T05:00:19Z
dc.date.available2017-08-26T05:00:19Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/55766
dc.description.abstractThomas C. Schelling, in his forward to the definitive book about why the United States was surprised at Pearl Harbor, describes the inability of governments to anticipate threats effectively: The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations - a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriate hearings and public discussion all seem to need to focus on a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and allow for a wider range of contingencies. Schelling was criticizing us for not thinking creatively or laterally, if you will, about the threats we face. But the same people who need to think in extended ways are the ones who have the most to do during a crisis. The IAGO project explores the question of whether or not software, in the form of a computational model of cognitive behavior, can contribute to better anticipation of asymmetric threats.
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleIntegrated Asymmetric Goal Organization (IAGO): A Multiagent Model of Conceptual Blendingen_US
dc.typeWhite Paperen_US
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.contributor.departmentMOVES Institute


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