Blurry vision: institutional impediments to reform in Saudi Arabia
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Authors
Spitler, Russell H.
Subjects
Saudi Arabia
Vision 2030
NTP
FBP
economic reform
social reform
political reform
political economy
institutions
resource curse
rent seeking
corruption
oil
oil curse
rentier state
patronage
subsidies
volatility
Saudization
privatization
diversification
monarchy
economic growth
development
unemployment
human capital
youth bulge
Wahhabi
education
Vision 2030
NTP
FBP
economic reform
social reform
political reform
political economy
institutions
resource curse
rent seeking
corruption
oil
oil curse
rentier state
patronage
subsidies
volatility
Saudization
privatization
diversification
monarchy
economic growth
development
unemployment
human capital
youth bulge
Wahhabi
education
Advisors
Looney, Robert
Date of Issue
2017-09
Date
Sep-17
Publisher
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
In April 2016, the Saudi Arabian government announced Vision 2030, a highly ambitious reform program designed to move the country away from its reliance on oil revenues and to liberalize its conservative social dynamics. Despite the monarchy’s autocratic power, the kingdom has largely failed to employ citizens in the private sector, diversify its industries beyond hydrocarbon-related activity, and privatize the key drivers of its economy since adopting these goals in 1970. The majority of the population is under the age of 30, unemployment is high, and international energy markets are changing, so the country’s leadership needs to make changes that provide opportunity for the people and make the economy more sustainable. This thesis examines why the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) struggles to implement economic and social reform. Analyzing interconnected political, economic, and social causes that manifest in the structure of the state and society, the resource curse, and market inefficiencies, the ultimate barrier to reform is the kingdom’s political dynamics. Without improvements to governance and modifications to the country’s patronage policies, economic change will be limited at best. Elites’ preferences for blocking political reform has hampered achievement of economic goals and will continue to prove problematic if not rescinded.
Type
Thesis
Description
Reissued 27 Sep 2018 to reflect updated abstract on pages i and v.
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Department
National Security Affairs (NSA)
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Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.