The utility of freedom a principal-agent model for unconventional warfare

Abstract

The conduct of warfare through proxies, also known as unconventional warfare, is a difficult feat for a nation to accomplish. The successful employment of surrogate forces depends to a significant degree on the relationships cultivated between the sponsor and the insurgent, and the various actors between the two. This thesis will examine the conduct of an Unconventional Warfare (UW) insurgency campaign from the perspective of Principal-agent Theory. The case study examined will be Operation ST CIRCUS, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) support for Tibetan insurgents from 1956 to 1974. The research will model the principal-agent dynamics of a UW campaign at the global, regional, and local levels, and will demonstrate the options available for the counter-insurgent to indirectly topple the insurgency by destabilizing the relationships between the principal and its agents. By applying Principal-agent Theory concepts to UW, this research will provide a new model for the examination of potential UW campaigns, and potential methods for countering UW campaigns conducted by global adversaries against U.S. interests.