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dc.contributor.authorKamara, Hassan M.
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-29T21:30:36Z
dc.date.available2017-11-29T21:30:36Z
dc.date.issued2015-07-13
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/56396
dc.descriptionHassan M. Kamara, "Making long-range planning work: the case of the US Army's 30-year strategic modernization plan." plan, Defense & Security Analysis, 31:3, 260-269.en_US
dc.descriptionThe article of record as published may be found at http://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2015.1056936
dc.description.abstractThe extensive timespan of evolving assumptions about future adversaries, US military engagements, and technology inherent in the US Army’s 30-year modernization strategy can overwhelm the management capacity of planners, and misdirect acquisition investments. Some military scholars have argued that long-range planning is futile due to the complexities of the global security environment. So how can the US Army manage the evolving assumptions inherent in its 30-year modernization strategy to ensure it remains a superior global force? This study will answer the above question by arguing that the US Army’s 30-year modernization strategy, while emulative of a similar modernization approach in the threat-based planning environment of the Cold War, is viable if supported by a method and a tool that manage investments and planning assumptions.en_US
dc.format.extent11 p.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherTaylor and Francisen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleMaking long-range planning work: the case of the US Army's 30-year strategic modernization planen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentDefense Analysis (DA)en_US


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