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dc.contributor.authorOwen, Guillermo
dc.date2009
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-14T21:14:25Z
dc.date.available2018-02-14T21:14:25Z
dc.identifier.citationOwen, G. 2009, "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions", International Game Theory Review, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 461--470.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/57015
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of coalition formation based on personal proprieties among the players of an n-person game. Several examples are worked out in detail, showing that certain coalitions are much more stable than others, and /or much more likely to form than others. We also consider the dynamics of such coalition-formation. By a numerical example, we show that small changes in the initial conditions can lead to very different results in the coalitions formed in a given game.
dc.format.extent7 p.
dc.publisherWorld Scientific
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
dc.titleEndogenous Formation of Coalitionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentApplied Mathematicsen_US


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