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dc.contributor.authorEggleston, Karen
dc.contributor.authorShen, Yu-Chu
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-27T18:27:50Z
dc.date.available2018-02-27T18:27:50Z
dc.date.issued2011-01
dc.identifier.citationEggleston, Karen, and Yu-Chu Shen. "Soft budget constraints and ownership: Empirical evidence from US hospitals." Economics Letters 110.1 (2011): 7-11.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/57086
dc.descriptionThe article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.016
dc.description.abstractConsistent with the property rights theory of ownership incorporating soft budget constraints (SBCs), we find that controlling for SBCs, for-profit hospitals drop safety-net services more often and exhibit higher mortality rates, suggesting aggressive cost control that damages non-contractible quality.en_US
dc.format.extent5 p.en_US
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleSoft budget constraints and ownership: Empirical evidence from US hospitalsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.contributor.departmentBusiness & Public Policy (GSBPP)
dc.subject.authorSoft budget constraintsen_US
dc.subject.authorOwnershipen_US
dc.subject.authorHealth careen_US
dc.subject.authorFor-profiten_US
dc.subject.authorHospital qualityen_US


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