Modeling cyber conflict to inform critical infrastructure defense
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Imagine a naval strike group patrolling in the middle of a territorially challenged and electromagnetically controlled area of the world. The threats to that group are varied and wide ranging which require the group to employ all available defensive and offensive tools. While the physical kinetic threat to the group can be detected as an external event, it is not always easily detected when that threat presents itself inside the control network of the strike group. In this scenario, it is possible that the lurking threat is exercising data collection among the ships, or simply lying in wait to take over the navigation system without the users knowing. No known architecture or decision framework exists to inform a critical infrastructure or cyber-physical system (CPS) when it is best to defend against a possible attack.
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