Customizing the Use of TINA (Truth in Negotiations Act) in the DoD
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Wang, Rendon, Champion, Ellen, & Walk (hereafter, Wang et al., 2016) identify the incentive problem that is characterized as a ﾓmoral hazardﾔ in the DoDﾒs current use of the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA). One of the examples they concentrated on was the ineffective use of TINA in the context of firm-fixed-price (FFP) contracts. Specifically, a contractor under an FFP contract that is subject to TINA has the following ill incentive: The fear of being held accountable for any significant unfavorable cost discrepancy (i.e., the actual incurred cost is significantly below the ex-ante cost estimate negotiated with the DoD as the basis for contract fixed-price) would strongly motivate the contractor to shirk (i.e., reduce cost-saving effort) or even engage in cost padding (e.g., by opportunistically incurring or allocating more costs to the government contracts). Such behavior leads to deadweight welfare loss that is ultimately borne by taxpayers. This study extends Wang et al. (2016) to a broader scope and greater depth. In particular, we propose to customize the use (or disuse) of TINA in the DoD for various contracting scenarios involving specific acquisition category (ACAT I through III), stage of the cycle (Milestones A, B, and C), and contract type. The bottom line is: we donﾒt believe the TINA policy should be prescribed via a ﾓone-size-fits-allﾔ approach; rather, the use or disuse of TINA should be customized to various situations. We continue to employ an economics-based, incentive-centric approach that focuses on investigation of agentsﾒ (i.e., DoD contractorsﾒ) incentives under various settings. Then we generate our policy recommendation through a ﾓwithﾔ and ﾓwithoutﾔ TINA comparison. TINA is a federal acquisition regulation, which goes beyond the DoD and DoN. We expect that significant cost savings can be generated for the DoD and DoN, as well as other federal government agencies, by providing such a framework described above. The remainder of the report is organized as follows. The next section describes the DoD acquisition process. Following that is a section that describes how TINA is implemented in DoD acquisition via a ﾓone-size-fits-allﾔ approach. Building on those two sections, the following one (Customizing the Use [or Disuse] of TINA in the DoD Acquisition Process) tailors the use or disuse of TINA (i.e., TINA waiver) to various circumstances. We offer a conclusion in the final section.
NPS Report NumberSYM-AM-17-045
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Wang, Chong (Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2017-03); SYM-AM-17-096Wang, Rendon, Champion, Ellen, & Walk (hereafter, Wang et al., 2016) identify the incentive problem that is characterized as a ﾓmoral hazardﾔ in the DoDﾒs current use of the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA). One of the ...
Wang, Chong (Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2017-05); NPS-CM-17-198Wang, Rendon, Champion, Ellen, and Walk (hereafter Wang et al., 2016) identify the incentive problem that is characterized as a ﾓmoral hazardﾔ in the Department of Defense's (DoD's) current use of the Truth in Negotiation ...
Wang, Chong; Rendon, Rene G.; Champion, Crystal; Ellen, Meredith; Walk, Jenny (2016-01); NPS-CM-16-014It has been more than 50 years since TINA was first enacted in 1962. In a nutshell, TINA requires contractors (often sole-source) to submit “cost or pricing data” when they negotiate the price of a contract with the federal ...