Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorDahl, Erik J.
dc.contributor.authorMcDermott, Kevin C.
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-24T22:36:11Z
dc.date.available2018-08-24T22:36:11Z
dc.date.issued2018-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/59717
dc.description.abstractA resilient nation must not only have a strong and functional military for defense, but also have the capability to collect tactical intelligence about adversaries to inflict the greatest potential damage in potential conflict. Regardless of the size and strength of forces, intelligence sharpens the military force’s lethality, ultimately making a nation powerful. Fundamentally, intelligence should be unbiased and objective. However, as the United States polarizes itself politically today between its two dominant parties, that objectivity is at risk. Political bias has been included in U.S. intelligence analysis and through a study of two cases, it is apparent that politicized intelligence often negatively impacts the intelligence community (IC), the military, and the citizens of the United States. The current system of appointing senior intelligence officials inevitably fosters politicized intelligence because of an inherent obligation of those appointed to serve the administration that selected them. This thesis recommends that to reduce politicization, legislation must require IC leaders to have served as intelligence officers first and with positional term limits, essentially making them professional, not political, appointments. The objective of this legislation would be to maintain the policymaker and IC leadership relationship while ensuring the public that the IC remains capable, knowledgeable, and unbiased.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/dopoliticalappoi1094559717
dc.publisherMonterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleDO POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS CREATE POLITICIZED INTELLIGENCE?en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderSimeral, Robert L.
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs (NSA)
dc.subject.authorpoliticized intelligenceen_US
dc.subject.authorintelligence communityen_US
dc.subject.authorintelligence reformen_US
dc.subject.authorintelligence and policymaker relationshipen_US
dc.subject.authorIraq Weapons of Mass Destructionen_US
dc.subject.authorISISen_US
dc.description.serviceLieutenant, United States Navyen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Arts in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studies (Homeland Security and Defense)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.identifier.thesisid30148
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record