Information superiority and game theory the value of varying levels of information

Abstract

The ability to acquire and use information superiority to enhance combat power and contribute to the success of military operations is a primary factor in the fulfillment of the tenets of Joint Vision 2020. This thesis examines how various levels of information and information superiority affect strategy choices and decisionmaking in determining the payoff value for opposing forces in a classic zero-sum two -sided contest. The results show that if opposing forces possess options with equivalent strategic capabilities, the payoff advantage is determined by the quantity of choices from which to choose. The degree of advantage in payoff for the force with superior information is determined by the amount of choices and the quantity of bad information for the opponent. When a force possesses significantly fewer strategic options, more superior information is required to assume a payoff advantage, and for a force having more flexibility, significantly less information is required to affect an advantage in payoff. Additionally, we see that the effects of intelligence provides the greatest payoff advantage when a force possesses its maximum number of strategic options combined with the opposition also having its maximum number of choices.